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Abstract
In this work, we propose a novel MIMO-aided security scheme. By exploiting an extra dimension
provided by MIMO systems for adding arti¯cial noise to the transmission process, the physical-layer
security is enhanced as a result. In the proposed scheme the physical-layer may rely on upper-layer
encryption techniques for security, which results in a cross-layer security scheme.
1 Introduction
As wireless devices become increasingly pervasive and essential, they are becoming both targets of
attacks and the very weapons with which such attacks can be carried out. Compared with wireline
networks, wireless networks are open to intrusion from the outside without the need of a physical
connection. The lack of security in these techniques may potentially result in a weak physical-layer
security. The wireless security has become a critical concern in the physical layer. Cryptographic
techniques can be used to provide security in a mobile environment, however these techniques do not
directly leverage the unique property of the wireless domain to address security threats.
Physical-layer security techniques, which are based on the shannon secrecy model [1] are e®ective
in resolving the boundary, e±ciency and link reliability issues. Wyner [2] and Csiszar and Korner [3]
developed the concept of the wire-tap channel for wired links. Based on these concepts, Hero [4] and
koorapaty et al. [5] presented an information security approach which used channel state information
(CSI) as the secret key in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) links. Unfortunately, attackers still
can use the blind deconvolution algorithm [6, 7, 8] to estimate channels, which makes these approaches
to lose security. Li et al. [9] and Kim et al. [10] developed MIMO security schemes which used
the attacker's blind identi¯cation capacity loss. Their schemes assumed that the channels of intended
receivers and attackers are neither identical, nor highly correlated. Under some special scenario where
the attackers is very close to intended receivers, this method can't provide positive secrecy capacity.
The built-in security of the physical-layer is de¯ned as the physical-layer transmissions guarantee
low-probability-of-interception (LPI) based on transmission properties such as modulations, signals and
channels, without resorting to source data encryption. No secret keys are required before transmissions.
1Physical-layer built-in security is in fact equivalent to perfect secrecy [1]. Almost all existing results on
physical-layer security are based on some kinds of assumptions that appear impractical [4, 5, 9, 10, 15].
Innovative cross-layer security designs with both physical-layer security and upper-layer traditional
security techniques are desirable for wireless networks. In this paper, we propose a cross-layer approach
to enhance the security of wireless networks for wireless environments. We combine cryptographic
techniques implemented in the higher layer with the physical layer security scheme using MIMO systems
to provide stronger security for wireless networks. Unlike the method in [4] and [5] we use multiple
antennas to add arti¯cial noise to the information signal such that only the intended receiver can
eliminate the noise and recover the information. Therefore the transmitter can communicate with the
intended receiver and prevent the attacker from decoding the message at the same time. The process
of adding arti¯cial noise is controlled by upper-layer cryptographic techniques. In our approach the
physical-layer can utilize upper-layer encryption techniques for security, while physical-layer security
techniques can also assist the security design in the upper-layer. Our new method also can be combined
with the methods in [6, 9] to farther enhance secrecy.
Figure 1: Delay transmit diversity scheme
2 A Novel MIMO Cross-Layer Secure Communication Model
Let us consider a single point-to-point MIMO system with arrays of nT transmit and nR receive anten-
nas. The transmitted data is denoted as a vector (s1(t); s2(t); ¢¢¢ ; sT(t)) . Typically, an array
with nT transmit antennas sends a nT £T signal matrix S over T time samples to nR receive antennas.
The transmission signal matrix can be formed as
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where si(t ¡ jTf), (0 · j < nT ¡ 1), is the fundamental transmission information signal, and Tf
represents the time delay. This is a typical delay diversity scheme in which multiple copies of the same
symbol are transmitted through multiple antennas in di®erent time slots as shown in Figure 1. However
we do not directly transmit the signal given by Eq. (1). Let Snoise be a T £ nN noise matrix de¯ned
as:
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where nN · nT and each row in Snoise is a set of pseudorandom sequences with the length T. We also
de¯ne the following binary control pseudorandom sequence matrix Scontrol:
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Each row in Scontrol is a set of pseudorandom sequences with the length T, and the elements in Scontrol
are denoted by binary bits with above notations. We can represent the transmission signals with the
following matrix X:
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3where the element x
j
i is determined by:
8
> > <
> > :
xi
j = si[t ¡ (j ¡ 1)Tf]; j · nN;vj;i = 0
xi
j = wj;i; j · nN;vj;i = 1
xi
j = si[t ¡ (j ¡ 1)Tf]; j > nN:
(5)
In other words, if the control element vj;i is zero, the corresponding antenna will transmit the information
signal. Otherwise, it will transmit the noise signal. The system block diagram is shown in Figure. 2.
Both the noise sequences Snoise and the control sequences Scontrol are the stream ciphers generated by
a set of keys. Both of them or one of them will be the secret keys between the transmitter and the
intended receiver.
Figure 2: Antenna array redundancy model
The generators of secret keystream Snoise and Scontrol are shown in Figure 3. For secret keystream
Snoise and Scontrol the principle of generation is same. Here we suggest two scheme, in which the stream
ciphers will be the optimal selection for its fast implement speed. We also hope that the stream ciphers
have ideal two-level autocorrelation and randomness properties such as balance distribution, long period,
ideal tuple, whose autocorrelation function is a delta function. This function is very similar with those
of gaussian white noise. A typical example is m-sequence. But the linear complexity of m-sequence
is very low. Another good candidate is the WG stream ciphers [16] which generate pseudorandom
sequence with high complexity and the same autocorrelation functions as m-sequences.
In Figure 3 (a) we generate the secret key K 0 ¯rstly, then the other keys is the shift of K 0, which
let the output keystream be di®erent when the keystream generators have the same structure . In this
scheme, K 0 is the key that legitimate communication partners will share together. Therefore, the size
of secret key is same as those of traditional cryptographic systems even if the secret keystream is a
matrix. The disadvantage of this scheme is that the whole system will be destroyed when the attacker
get the secret key. In Figure 3 (b) every row of the keystream matrix has its own secret key. There
4are n di®erent secret keys which are independent each other. The size of the secret key is bigger than
the usual situation. The advantage of this scheme is that the leak of one or several secret keys only
let the secret level of the system become lower and can not let the whole system be destroyed. For the
structure of two stream cipher schemes we suggested in Figure 3., we can ¯nd a similar design in the
literature, such as w7 [17].
Figure 3: Keystream matrix generator
3 The Receiver for the Proposed Model
It is assumed that there are nT transmit antennas, nR receive antennas for the intended receiver, and
nA receive antennas for the attacker. We use a nR £ nT matrix H
(i) to describe the channel from the
transmitter to the intended receiver in the ith time slot and a nA£nT matrix E
(i) to denote the channel
from the transmitter to the attacker in the ith time slot. H
(i) and E
(i) are de¯ned as follows:
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In the ith time slot, the signal in the jth receiving antennas of the intended receiver and the attacker
are respectively
ri
j =
nN X
t=1
hi
j;txi
t + ni
j +
nT X
k=nN+1
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k + ni
j; (8)
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where ri
j and yi
j denote the signals received by the legitimate user and the attacker in time slot i,
respectively. ni
j and ~ ni
j are the channel noises for the legitimate receiver and the attacker respectively.
In some time slot the ¯rst terms in Eqs. (8) and (9) will become noise. The legitimate receiver knows the
noise, so this term can be removed. However, the attacker doesn't know the pseudo-sequence Scontrol.
Hence, this term provides another noise component and the total noise becomes high. As a result the
attacker's signal is a degraded version of the legitimate receiver's signal. According to Wyner [2], it is
possible to achieve a non-zero secrecy capacity.
3.1 The Intended Receiver
For the intended receiver, a maximum ratio combining diversity can be used. In the ith time slot, the
output signal is a linear combination of a weighted replica of all of the received signals, which is given
by
^ r
i =
nR X
j=1
®jri
j (10)
where ®j is a weight factor for the receive antenna j. In the maximum ratio combining, the weight
factor of each receive antenna is chosen to be in proportion to the ratio of its own signal voltage and
the noise power. Let Aj and Áj be the amplitude and the phase of the received signal ri
j, respectively.
Assuming that each receive antenna has the same average noise power, the weight factor ®j can be
represented as:
®j = Aje¡iÁj (11)
The decision rule for the ML decoder can be stated as
^ si(t) = arg mink^ r
i ¡
nR X
k=1
nT X
j=1
hi
k;jxi
jk2 (12)
^ si(t) is the estimated transmission signal in the ith time slot. Because the intended receiver knows the
Eq. (5), it can eliminate the noise by substituting the former slot estimation transmission signal and
wi;j into xi
t.
3.2 The Attacking Receiver
The attackers can use the same method that described from Eq.(9) to Eq.(12). Hence they don't know
the Scontrol. The noise can't be canceled. They can also use the original VLST receiver [11] based
on a combination of interference suppression and cancellation, which separates the data streams and
thereafter independently decodes each stream. The algorithm is described as following:
Let the order set
KOpt = fk1;k2;¢¢¢ ;knTg (13)
6be a permutation of the integers f1;2;¢¢¢ ;nTg specifying the order in which components of ith slot
transmitted symbol vector x(i) = fxi
1;xi
2;¢¢¢ ;xi
nTgT are extracted. Later we show how to determine a
particular ordering KOpt which is optimal in a certain sense. The detection algorithm which operates
on received signal y(i) = fyi
1;yi
2;¢¢¢ ;yi
nAgT can be described as following steps.
Step 1: Let yi
1 = yi. Using nulling vector mk1, form a linear combination of the components of yi
1
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i
k1:
b
i
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1 (14)
Step 2: Slice b
i
k1 to obtain ^ xk1
^ xk1 = Q(b
i
k1) (15)
where Q(¢) denotes the quantization (slicing) operation appropriate to the constellation in use.
Step 3: Canceling ^ xk1 from the received vector y(i) results in modi¯ed received vector yi
2
yi
2 = yi
1 ¡ ^ xk1(E
(i))k1 (16)
where (E
(i))k1 denotes the k1th column of E
(i). Step 3 are then performed for components k2;¢¢¢ ;knT
by operation in turn on the progression of modi¯ed received vectors yi
2;yi
3;¢¢¢ ;yi
nT
The speci¯cs of the detection process depend on the criterion chosen to compute the nulling vectors
mk1. One of common choice is zero-forcing (ZF) method. The full ZF detection algorithm can be
described completely as a recursive procedure, including determination of the optimal ordering, as
follows:
Initialization:
l Ã 1 (17a)
yi
1 = yi (17b)
G1 = (E
(i))y (17c)
k1 = argmin
j
k(G1)jk2 (17d)
Recursion
mkl = (Gi)kl (17e)
bkl = mklyi
l (17f)
^ xkl = Q(bkl) (17g)
yi
l+1 = yi
l ¡ ^ xkl(E
(i))kl (17h)
Gl+1 = (E
(i)
l )y (17i)
kl+1 = argmin
j= 2fk1;¢¢¢;klg
k(Gl+1)jk2 (17j)
7l = l + 1 (17k)
where (E
(i))y in Eq. (17c) denotes the moore-Penrose pseudoinverse [11] of matrix E
(i). (Gi)j in Eq.
(17d) and Eq. (17e) denotes the jth row of Gi. E
(i)
l in Eq. (17i) can be obtained by zeroing column
k1;k2;¢¢¢ ;kl of E
(i).
4 Comparison the Proposed New Model with the Traditional
Stream Cipher Encryption System
In a synchronous stream cipher encryption system, let m = m1;m2;¢¢¢ be a plaintext sequence which
will be encrypted. The stream cipher contains a keystream generator that produced a pseudorandom
sequence, called the keystream, z = z1;z2;¢¢¢. In general, the ith symbol in the keystream, zi, is a
function of the key K and the previous plaintext symbols m1;m2;¢¢¢ ;mi, which can be represented by
zi = fi[K;(m1;m2;¢¢¢ ;mi)] (18)
The keystream together with an encryption function, gi, are used to encrypt the message m symbol by
symbol, as
ci = gi(zi;mi) (19)
where ci is the ith symbol in the ciphertext.
The simplest case is that
zi = fi[K]
and ci = zi © mi
Ususlly, hope the functions fi and gi are nonlinear function. In practical application of stream cipher
encryption system, we use di®erent kind of nonlinear functions to imitate the random properties. In
our new model, let s = s1;s2;¢¢¢ be the information sequence which will be transmitted. We also have
the noise controlled by a pseudorandom sequence as key Scontrol transmitted by nN transmit antennas.
Let Ni
j denote the ¯rst two terms in Eq. (8) and (9). Then we have
Ni
j = fci
j[Scontrol;(s1;s2;¢¢¢ ;si)] (20)
The received signal can model as:
ri
j = gci
j[Ni
j;(xi
nN+1;xi
nN+2;¢¢¢)] (21)
where xi
k;(k = nN + 1;nN + 2;¢¢¢) is the element of X in Eq.(4). In Eq. (15) and (16), the function
fci
j and gci
j are determined by fading channel coe±cients and noises which are random functions with
high nonlinear properties. These random and nonlinear properties can be broken by channel estimation
or searching the controlling sequence Scontrol. But the performance properties BER have to be paid for
the attacker. The secret capacity can be obtained.
85 The Performance Properties of the Proposed Method
In this section, we use simulations to study the e®ectiveness of the proposed transmission scheme by
evaluating the bit error rate (BER) of the intended receiver and the attacker. The channel is assumed
to be able to block Rayleigh fading, i.e., it is constant during the transmission of one packet, but
randomly changes between packets. Each packet contains 31 BPSK symbols. Here let the number of
receiver antennas nR and transmit antenna nT be 2 and 8, respectively. The attacker and the intended
receiver have the same receiver antennas. There are nN antennas to transmit the noise signal among
the nT transmitter antennas. The parameter nN is chosen to be 2, 4 and 6. We use 6 di®erent m-
sequences as the control pseudorandom sequences. In this work, we assume that an equal amount of
power is allocated to all the sub-channels. The methods described here can be applied to a system using
water¯lling-based allocations as well.
We do the simulations under two di®erent conditions. ¯rstly, we let the noise sequences Snoise be
public. The control sequences Scontrol acts as a secret key between the transmitter and the intended
receiver. Secondly, Both the noise sequences Snoise and the control sequences Scontrol are secret between
the transmitter and the intended receiver. Figure.4 and Figure.5 show the BER for the proposed novel
MIMO secure communication system under the fading channel in the two simulation conditions. From
the simulation, we note that the more antennas transmit the noise the higher the security level is. In the
meanwhile, less antennas can be used to transmit the information. Thus the penalty paid for the secure
transmission of the information therefore is mostly in the rate of information that can be transmitted.
Hence, there is a tradeo® between the of security level achieved and the transmission rate. When the
noise sequences Snoise is public, the performances of this scheme are worst than those of the scheme
that the noise sequences Snoise is kept as secret.
Figure 4: BER performance of novel MIMO secure communication system under fading channel,the
noise sequences Snoise is public
9Figure 5: BER performance of novel MIMO secure communication system under fading channel,the
noise sequences Snoise is secret
6 The Secret Capacity
In [3], the secrecy capacity Cs is de¯ned as the maximum rate at which a transmitter can reliably send
information to an intended receiver such that the rate at which the attacker obtains this information is
arbitrarily small. In other words, the secrecy capacity is the maximal number of bits that a transmitter
can send to an intended receiver in secrecy for each use of the channel. If the channel from the
transmitter to the intended receiver and the channel from the transmitter to the attacker have di®erent
bit error probabilities (BER) " and ±, respectively, i.e., the common input to channel is the binary
random variable X, and the binary random variables received by the legitimate and the attacker are Y
and Z where PY jX(yjx) = 1¡" if x = y, PY jX(yjx) = " if x 6= z, PZjX(zjx) = 1¡± if x = z, PZjX(zjx) = ±
if x 6= z. Without loss of generality, we may assume that " · 0:5 and ± · 0:5. The secret capacity Cs
is [12]
Cs =
(
h(±) ¡ h("); if ± > "
0; otherwise.
(22)
where h denotes the binary entropy function de¯ned by
h(p) = ¡plog2p ¡ (1 ¡ p)log2(1 ¡ p) (23)
Based on the BER results in Figure.4 and Figure.5 for the intended receiver and attacker, respec-
tively, the secret capacity is calculated by Eq.(17) and shown in Figure.6 and Figure.7. It is assumed
that the transmitter and the intender receiver can achieve the normal communication when the BRE
10performance of the intended receiver is less than 10¡2. Therefore, our new method can achieve su±-
ciently good secret capacity within the corresponding SNR ranges.
Figure 6: The secret channel capacity from the BER performance results,the noise sequences Snoise is
public
7 Comparison the Proposed New Model with the Other Phys-
ical Layer Security Models
The existing physical-layer security techniques [4, 5, 9, 10, 15] are to guarantee wireless transmissions
with low-probability-of-interception (LPI) which do not directly rely on upper-layer data encryption
or secret keys. All methods can be realized based on channel diversity by using multiple antennas
transmissions and receiving. The method presented in [4] used the channel state information (CSI) as
the secret key. The drawback is that the eavesdroppers can get the CSI and the CSI changes frequently
because of communication condition changing. So the CSI secret key will be very weak sometimes. The
new proposed cross-layer model leverages the upper-layer secret key combining with multiple antenna
diversity. This method can provide solid and stronger secret than method in [4]. The performances of
our approaches do not depend on the number of the receivers, which are di®erent from the methods in
[4,10] whose performances depend on the number of the receivers. So the new method will be a good
candidate for downlink transmission. Even if the receivers only have one antenna, this scheme also can
work well. The method introduced in [10] which can be described as a randomized MIMO transmission
scheme also focused on the downlink transmission. In this case the channel is known to the transmitter.
Then the transmit antenna weights are designed by a special deliberate randomization method for LPI
transmission. We compare the secret capacity of the method and our approach in Figure 8. They have
close property. But the method in [10] assumed that the channels of intended receivers and attackers
are highly correlated, which made this method become impractical.
11Figure 7: The secret channel capacity from the BER performance results,the noise sequences Snoise is
secret
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel MIMO-based secure communication scheme in which the extra de-
mission provided by the MIMO system is leveraged to enhance the physical layer security in wireless
networks. In our approach, the physical-layer can use the upper-layer encryption techniques to control
transmission sequences. So the security of approach is based on the secret key. Because the eaves-
droppers can only receive the noisy signals, they have to ¯nd the secret key in the noisy key stream.
It is more di±cult than traditional attacking to ciphers which assumed that the key stream is error
free. Therefore, our scheme combines the higher layer cryptographic techniques with the physical layer
security together. A more detailed study on the robustness of the scheme against attacking to ¯nd
the secret key is left for future. From the simulation we also can know that the number of antennas
which transmit noises provides the performance tradeo® between the security level and the MIMO
performance gains.
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